

A
LETTER
TO

A High-Churchman,

In Answer to a

PAMPHLET,

INTITLED,

Great Britain and Ireland
REASONS *why this Nation*
should put a speedy End to
this Expensive War.

*Quid enim per Deos immortales potest Reipublice
prodesse nostra Legatio? Prodesse dico? Quid
si etiam obfutura est? Obfutura? Quid si
jam nocuit? Tull. Phil. 12.*

L O N D O N;

Printed for *A. Baldwin* near the *Oxford-Arms*
in *Warwick-Lane.* M. DCC. XI.

Price 6d.

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Printed by D. B. for J. B. in the Strand, near St. Dunstons Church.
1741. 12.

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LETTER

TO A

High Churchman, &c.

S I R,

YOU have desir'd I would send you my Thoughts relating to the Peace, because it is what all true *Englishmen* wish for, and what you promis'd to your Borough at the last Election. You are pleas'd to add, the Reasons for it are now made evident by a Pamphlet lately printed; and that you have no room to doubt but it will be a very good one, because not only *Abel Roper*, but a much greater Man, has promis'd it shall be a better Peace than has been concluded for *England* these two hundred years. Nor can I blame you for being sanguine in the belief of a matter you so heartily wish for; but sure I am, as much as you profess your self a Tory, as much as you are inclin'd to think every thing well done that has been

transacted in the publick Affairs for these twelve Months past, you are too good an *Englishman* entirely to give up your Judgment to the Humour and Dictates of any Party whatever. You have too much sense to be led by the Nose in things directly opposite to your own Reason, and are so honest a Man you will not in all Cases *jurare in verba Magistrum*.

'Tis upon this presumption that I continue my Correspondence with you; for could I believe you so far abandon'd to Iniquity and Folly, as too many now are, who either have sold their Consciences at the Market-Price, or acted by a Principle of implicate Faith, have given up their Senses entirely to the Disposition of their Leaders: I should hold it wholly needless and impertinent to attempt to undeceive you. Even as it is, perhaps my Endeavours may prove fruitless: for I am not naturally vain of my own Conceptions; and did not the Dispute between us depend more upon positive Facts than Skill in Argument, I should be less willing to entertain you upon this Subject.

The Author of that Pamphlet, you mention with so much Rapture, intitled, *Reasons why this Nation should put an end to this expensive War*, has, I confess, argu'd so very strenuously for the Interest of *France*, that I shall never suspect him to be a Pensioner to the present Ministry, notwithstanding all those Airs he is pleas'd to give himself of a familiar Correspondedee with them, and of having been made privy to all the Projects that were offer'd for raising of Money the last Sessions. He may act the Man of Importance as much as he pleases, and say as many fine things in favour of the Queen and the present Administration

stration as he will, to cover his sinister Intentions; yet certain it is, by his manner of writing, that he is disaffected to the Government, an Advocate for *France*, and an Enemy to the Alliance.

I should not, perhaps, have thought it worth my while to take notice of this Author, (tho you have been assur'd he writ by Authority) or of his Correspondent *Abel*; but have refer'd you directly to the old Preliminaries, and those lately publish'd; and then have left you to judge for your self, whether of the two were better for *England*; if these two worthy Gentlemen did not appear to have entred into a Combination to impose upon the World. The *Pamphleteer*, it seems, was to prepare you for a Peace, by the Necessities the Nation labours under: from whence he modestly infers, that we must be glad of any Peace *France* will be pleas'd to grant us: And then comes the News-monger with Preliminaries so surprizingly advantageous, that you cannot tell, whether you shou'd more admire the good Fortune of *England*, in being able to obtain 'em; or the Clemency of *France*, in being willing to condescend so far to make us easy.

To these Preliminaries, as if they were not self-sufficient to convince us of the good Consequences that are likely to attend them, the News-monger is pleas'd to add an Account of the additional Promises made by Monsieur *Mesnager*; and to crown the Work, gives you so full and explanatory a Comment, both on the Preliminaries and Promises aforesaid, that you must, in his Opinion, be a very strange Person not to vote immediately with him for a Peace, upon the present Terms:

Terms: the Substance of which Comment, to shew his good Correspondence with the Pamphleteer, is taken from his Reasons; for it had been agreed, I suppose, between them to quote each other by Turns, as Occasion shou'd serve.

But is it possible, for a Man of your good Understanding, to be thus grossly impos'd upon? Is not the difference between the last Preliminaries and the present very apparent? Will you then suffer your self to be instructed in Politicks, by an Author who has betray'd even the very Cause he would seem to support? Can you subscribe your Judgment to the Opinion of a News-monger; or to that of the Person whose speaking Trumpet he is?

I am sure, I have often heard you speak with that respect of the Duke of *M*——, which his shining Vertues justly claim from every *English* Man: And can you now think it reasonable, that any one should take the Liberty of traducing that Great General, who has so often, and with such wonderful Success asserted the Liberty of *Europe*; of whose consummate Prudence the whole Alliance have so just an Opinion, that they have entrusted him, more than once, with greater Powers than ever they ventur'd to lodge in the hands of any other foreign Prince, or even with their own Countrymen, and to whose Conduct the present Peace, if it was a good one, is entirely owing?

Yet this is a part of the *Exordium* to your so much admir'd Pamphlet. For the well-meaning Author, having first endeavour'd to prove, that all our Acts of Parliament, and of Council, have for these many Years cajol'd us with Hopes of Peace, tho they never intended it; he proceeds to show, that *Our Great Navy has spread the Seas to the Expence*
of

of Three Millions yearly, to no purpose; hinting, that *France* has taken a much better Method: whereby, I presume, he may intend, that it had been for the Interest of *England* to have kept no more Ships at Sea than *France* has done. And from hence no other Inference can possibly be made, but that he is either egregiously ignorant of Commerce, or that he is extremely angry at Sir George Bing, for having prevented the Pretender's landing some Years ago in *North-Britain*.

But to deal as impartially with the Land-Service, as he has done by the Sea, he proceeds to tell you, *That in our Land-Armies we* Pag. 6.
expend mighty Sums to perform trifling Exploits, and please our selves with a few Inches of the Enemies Ground, bought too dear, and paid for with a double Price of Mony, and of Blood. And in the next Paragraph adds, *That we threw away the Lives of 22000 of the best and bravest Soldiers in Christendom, merely upon a pique between two haughty Generals, to decide who should possess the Hedges of Tanniers, &c.* Yet he solemnly protests, *That this brief Recapitu-* Pag. 8.
lation of the State of the Affair in Flanders is thus laid down here, not in the least to lessen the Esteem we ought to have for our Generals and Great Officers imploy'd in the War. And sure you may take his word for it! God forbid that the honest Man's good Intentions should be wrested to so evil a Construction! But why all this Oratory then? Why so much Hypocrisy and Affectation? Could he not have told us in plain Terms, without abusing those Great Officers, who have so often ventur'd their Lives in defence of their Country both by Sea and Land, that notwithstanding we have had a Fleet at Sea, the French Privateers have

have taken several of our Ships; and that our Victories in *Flanders* have cost us both Men and Money? for the nine first Pages of his Book, with all his flourishes, amount to no more than this; and these are Truths that would have been allow'd him without the least difficulty: For I presume Merchants would not insure, if they did not know, that in sailing without Convoy, they run a hazard of being taken; neither did ever any Man expect that the present War should have been carry'd on without an Expence of Men and of Money. But I will venture to assure this Author, as witty as he and his Companions are upon the Siege of *Bauchain*, that there is not an Instance of such a Siege to be found, carry'd on with that Success, under such difficult Circumstances, since that of *Alexia* in *Gaul* by *Julius Cesar*.

Yet even this manner of Discourse, as extraordinary as it might appear in any other Country, is very modest in respect to the Liberty he has been pleas'd to take with our good Allies the *Dutch*: For he says, " The French
 " alledge, that they kept their Commissioners
 " like Prisoners in a Garison, permitting them
 " to speak with no body but the *Dutch* Deputies,
 " who came and went like mere Messengers of an Errand: That they were not allow'd to see any of the Ministers of the other Allies, tho they were concern'd in the
 " War as well as they, as if the *Dutch* were
 " afraid that their Proposals were so reasonable, the rest of the Allies would think
 " them sufficient, and be inclin'd to close with them: That the *Dutch* acted by the Pensionary and the Lord T——, in concert with
 " the D. of M. and the *English* Court would
 " never

“ never come to any Certainty what would
 “ content them ; but daily declar’d every
 “ thing unsatisfactory, till at last, being
 “ press’d to declare what they would have,
 “ they put the whole upon an Impossibility,
 “ as to the King of *France* obliging his Grand-
 “ son to evacuate *Spain* ; refusing the least
 “ Equivalent for peaceably giving up such
 “ vast Dominions, above eight years in pos-
 “ session, &c.”

And as if this was not enough to shew his
 Inclination to our Enemies, and his Dislike of
 our Friends, he treats them with the same
 freedom in several other Passages of his Pam-
 phlet ; tho’ this alone might be sufficient to
 prove him, what I ventur’d to say he was,
 an Advocate for *France* : which Character he
 seems not a little ambitious of, for lest what
 is call’d in favour of the *French*, in the a-
 bovecited Page, should be mistaken for the
 words of the *French* Plenipotentiaries only,
 and not be believ’d the Author’s proper Sense,
 he is pleas’d to add another Page and a half
 intire of his own upon the same Subject, and
 as worthy our Remark as the former.

“ Many more Particulars might be objected Pag. 12.

“ here against the Methods and Measures ta-
 “ ken with the Enemy in the last Treaty,
 “ which was manag’d at *Gertrudenberg* ; but
 “ this may suffice to include the whole (*viz.*)
 “ That we treated them as if the King of
 “ *Spain* had been Prisoner of War, and the
 “ King of *France* fled from *Versailles* : or ra-
 “ ther, as if a certain General had put them
 “ both into his Coach ; and as if not only *Spain*,
 “ but *France* it self had been lost. And that
 “ this may not pass for the words of this
 “ Pamphlet only, it may not be amiss to note,

“ that when the Marquis d’ Uxelles com-
 “ plain’d of the ill Success of their Negotia-
 “ tion, and that they treated as if they had
 “ France in possession; he was answer’d, That
 “ his Master ought to reckon it his good Fortune,
 “ that he had the Honour to save the Kingdom of
 “ FRANCE upon such easy Terms. Whe-
 “ ther it was due to the Situation of our Af-
 “ fairs at that time, to push matters to such a
 “ height, the Process of another Campaign
 “ may better argue than any other kind of
 “ Demonstration, since another whole Sum-
 “ mer is past over, another glorious Cam-
 “ paign in Flanders ended. The great and so
 “ much boasted Impression the Duke of Savoy
 “ was to make, is ended, and that Prince re-
 “ tir’d, and France is not yet won; no, not
 “ a foot set in its Dominions, and but a very
 “ few Inches of Ground gain’d, which we have
 “ paid dear for (*viz.*) many Thousands of
 “ our best Troops kill’d and wounded, &c.”

Thus having plainly prov’d to you, that it
 was a very unreasonable thing to treat the
French Plenipotentiaries as the *Dutch* did, in
 demanding Restitution of the entire *Spanish*
 Monarchy, and that they had an Interest in
 carrying on the present War, because their
 Taxes are only above twice as heavy as ours:
 After a small but florid Digression upon the
 false Accounts that have from time to time
 been given us of the State of the Kingdom of
France, and of their Army, he naturally pro-
 ceeds to his two very material Questions, *viz.*

1. What Occasion we have for Peace?
2. What Condition the French are in to carry on the War?

From which two Questions, impartially
 search’d into, he doubts not but to prove,
 that

that it is absolutely necessary for us to put an end to this War: And so we say all, provided a Peace could be made upon safe and lasting Terms. But of this more hereafter, when we come at his important Queries.

Let us at present only see how elegantly he sets out the Decay of Trade, and Weight of P. 16, 17, Taxes in his own Country, in four successive 18, 19, Pages, as might have been expected from the first of his material Questions: But surely the same Justice was likewise due to *France*, yet not a word must be said to her prejudice; and therefore as to the second material Question, *Magnus hiatus in Manuscripto*: and here again we may plainly trace the *Frenchman*.

Suppose then, for Argument-sake, I should allow all he asserts relating to the Decay of Trade at Home to be true (tho he acknowledges that not to be his peculiar Talent) for Argument-sake, I say, because it is morally impossible that the Woollen Manufacture can be so much decay'd, since it is very well known, that the Ballance of our Trade with *Portugal* only is near a Million Sterling. Yet should I grant him all this, and whatever else he has alledg'd about Mortgages and Anticipations, I should still be at liberty to deny his Consequence, and might very reasonably assert, that if *England* has been reduc'd by this War, *France* has been humbled much more by it. The Alliance would otherwise have but a very dismal Prospect, even from a much better Peace than is at present discours'd of: For if *France* be in so flourishing a Condition now, as this Author would insinuate, what will she not be able to do some few years hence, when she shall have taken breath, and in concert with *Spain*, shall have amass'd, from the Product of her

own Soil, and that of the *Indies*, such immense Treasures, as may threaten utter Destruction to the rest of *Europe*? But I shall not urge this Argument further at present, because I may have occasion to make use of it in another place.

However, this Author having got into a Road of deducing certain Consequences from uncertain Principles, from what he neither believes himself, nor can be so unreasonable to expect you should upon a second Reading, he is pleas'd to draw a very dismal Conclusion indeed; which is, that *England* having but three things to chuse of, viz.

1. *A General Excise.*
2. *Putting a stop to the Payment of Interest in the Funds already charg'd and establish'd.*
3. *Or to put an end to the War.*

She will in all probability chuse the worst of the three; that is, a Peace upon such Conditions as we can get, and they no doubt would be very advantageous, if *France* was once as sincerely convinc'd of our Necessities, as he would persuade his Countrymen to be.

But he is pleas'd to enlarge further upon these Heads, and tell you, he is positive that ten parts in twelve of the Landed Men would come into a *Stop of the Funds*, rather than a *General Excise*: that is to say, that there are at present a Set of Representatives, so little concern'd for Publick Faith, that they would vote for shutting up the *Exchequer*; which, God be thank'd, was never yet heard of but once before in *England*, and that in the time of a most scandalous Administration, when *France* had many Pensioners in our Court; at a time when the Prince himself, then upon the *British* Throne, vilely contributed towards prostituting the

the Honour of his own Imperial Crown to the Ambition of his Neighbour, and barter'd the Welfare of Posterity for a Mistress. To those blessed Times it is we owe the present Burden, now so much complain'd of. Had not *England* then assisted to raise the Naval Power of *France*, his most Christian Majesty had not now been so formidable an Enemy: Had we not then, without the least regard to the Ballance of *Europe*, not only suffer'd, but even help'd him to make those Conquests, which have since render'd *France* so considerable, he had not now been in condition to dispute the Justice of the Queen's Title to these Realms, and to wage War alone against the united Powers of *Europe*.

This indeed is an Expedient, by which we may guess at the Probity of the Person that propos'd it; but it is such a one, as the House of Commons, notwithstanding his base Opinion of them, will never enter into: Neither will there be so great a necessity even for a *General Excise* perhaps, as this Author is pleas'd to affirm. For tho I had not the honour to be admitted to a view of the several Schemes propos'd the last Year to the Government for raising of Money, yet I do acknowledge to have seen other Schemes for raising large Sums of Money with great ease to the Subject, which have not yet been put in execution, tho they do not tend towards a *General Excise*. But were it so, I dare believe there is not an honest Man in *England*, who being fully appriz'd of the true State of the Case, and of what he is likely to risque by an unsafe Peace, that would not willingly submit to this, or even harder Terms, rather than accept a Peace upon such Conditions, as

France

France might be able to break at her pleasure. And this the *Dutch* are so well convinc'd of, that by this Author's own Confession, they patiently submit to a *General Excise*, wisely resolving to undergo a perfect Cure, rather than run the hazard of an incurable Relapse.

But whatever this Pamphleteer's Talents may be towards Commerce or Politicks, he has an excellent one at Slander. He is pleas'd to wound the present Ministry thro the sides of the Whigs, tho at the same time he would be thought familiar with them; for I suppose he means the Whigs, by *A dissatisfy'd Party of Men amongst us*: And these, says he, are of opinion that the way to overthrow the present Ministry, is to plunge them in matter of Funds, ruin the publick Credit, and bring them to such Exigencies, that they cannot carry on the War; that then the Queen must change the Ministry again. Did ever any Whig take so much liberty with the Queen's Ministers? Did ever any one of the *Dissatisfy'd Party* venture to publish such Doctrine as this in print? If they did, let him produce his Author; if he cannot, the Slander turns upon himself, and this must be his own malicious Conception: instead of serving the present Ministry, he has been writing a Libel against them, and publishing a Weakness the Whigs never durst suspect them of. On the contrary, the *Dissatisfy'd Party* have cheerfully embark'd with the Government in the present Year's Funds, and have freely advanc'd large Sums of Money to subsist the Queen's Forces abroad, for which they have neither yet got Payment of Principal nor Interest: Nay, the *Bank of England*, whose Members have long been suspected for Men of Revolution-Principles, did lately furnish

nish the Government with *Two Hundred Thousand Pounds*, when the *Tory-Remitters* either could not, or were not willing to serve them any longer; for certainly they could not have been abandon'd in such a manner as they were, unless it had been of their own seeking. This Imputation therefore upon the Whigs, must be as foolish as it is malicious.

But not contenting himself thus to have blasted the great Guardians of our Liberty and Property under God and the Queen, he makes so faint a Defence in their behalf, that he plainly delivers them up into the hands of their Enemies, if any such there be; and nothing is impossible in this ungrateful Age: for I must confess to have heard very substantial Men in the City lament the Loss of Publick Credit, with as grave a Countenance, as if there had been a real occasion for it; and charging that Decay, which may possibly have been the Misfortune of the Times, to the ill Management of particular Persons.

But I never yet heard any Man so bold as this Pamphleteer: for he plainly insinuates, that the present Ministry are not able to carry on the War, but by one of the two Methods he has propos'd; and that rather than be so hard, as he calls it, upon the Subject, they will make use of the Queen's Royal Prerogative to conclude a Peace: *which if it were* Page 24.
not then so advantageously concluded as it ought to be, or as it might have been; yet the People might see who had compel'd them to it, and on whom all the Blame of it ought to be laid. These are his words, and a pretty Excuse they would be for an unsafe or scandalous Peace.—The English of this Paragraph, compar'd with what

I have already quoted, plainly amounts to this—That the *Dissatisfy'd Party*, alias the *Whigs*, are so numerous, opulent, and powerful a Body of People, that the Government cannot carry on the War without their Concurrence, but by a General Excise, or shutting up the Exchequer: That they will refuse their Assistance, if the Queen does not change her Ministry; and therefore the Ministry, rather than be hard upon the Subject, must be forc'd to make use of the Queen's Prerogative to clap up a Peace, not so advantageous as it ought to be, or once might have been, and then lay the fault upon the *Dissatisfy'd Party*, for having compell'd them to it.

Admirable Doctrine truly! Yet you can forgive all this in a Man that you fancy writes on your side. But I am very well assur'd, if any one of the *Dissatisfy'd Party* had ventur'd to publish such a Declaration, we should have had a severe Censure pass'd upon him, and an Address to the Queen for a vigorous Prosecution by the Attorney-General.

Page 24. But let us now proceed with him to the main End and Design of this Pamphlet, viz. The Reasons why we should put a speedy End to this War: and these indeed are very cogent.

Ibid. I. The first is, Because it does not seem easy for us to carry on the War.

Quia non est mollis ad Astra via.

It was not indeed an easy thing to bring about the Revolution.

It was not an easy thing for the Dutch to take so vigorous a Resolution, when the French King offer'd 'em Terms of Peace at the beginning of this War, enforc'd by the presence

fence of a formidable Army upon their Frontier, at a time when their Troops had been made Prisoners by Surprise.

It was not an *easy thing* for the Duke of Savoy to defend his Capital so gallantly as he did, when he had not an Inch of Ground left besides in his whole Principality.

And yet all these things, with many more as difficult, by the Blessing of God upon honest Endeavours in a righteous Cause, we have liv'd to see effected.

But this Argument is in it self so very extraordinary, that one would think it impossible it should admit of any Aggravation, either by his own manner of expatiating upon it, or by any Comment that another Man could invent. Yet so particular is this Author in his way of Reasoning, that to convince you it is not *easy* to carry on the War, he confesses the Allies do it even by those very Methods, which he would have you think most terrible at least, if not impracticable.

2. His second Reason is; *Because, by a Treaty of Peace, it is probable the true Ends and Designs of this War, and for which it was at first undertaken, may be obtain'd.* But now the Preliminaries are printed, I have too good an opinion of his Modesty, to believe he will insist any longer upon this head: ——— If he should, I would beg leave to refer him to a Pamphlet lately printed, entitled, *Remarks on the Preliminary Articles offer'd by the French King, in order to procure a General Peace.* Pag. 26.

But because he is pleas'd to be so very critical in his Remarks upon the various Titles which our several Money-Bills have born; I believe, it may not be improper to acquaint him, that he could not have given a greater
C Instance

Instance of the late Ministry's plain and honest Dealing with the Parliament, than this Method of informing them without Reserve, what Uses the publick Mony was to be apply'd to: tho the first of his Titles, *For reducing the Exorbitant Power of France*; or at least the second, *For obtaining a lasting, safe, and honourable Peace*, might have subsisted to this hour: for I will venture to affirm, and hope I shall be able to prove, that such a Peace cannot be had whilst the Duke of *Anjou* shall continue in possession of *Spain*, and the *West Indies*; of which this Author in some measure owns him the lawful Sovereign already, even before the Treaty is concluded: for he styles him *Philip V.* and *King Philip*, in several Pages of his Pamphlet. But I presume, he is not entrusted with full Powers by her Majesty to make the Treaty, and I cannot help hoping as an *Englishman*, that those who shall be honour'd with that Trust will be of another opinion.

Page 28. 3. His third Reason is; *Because, that tho it were to be allow'd that by continuing the War, some greater Advantage in the Terms of a Peace might be obtain'd; yet that those Advantages do not seem adequate and proportionable to the Expence and Loss, the Effusion of Blood, the Expence of Treasure, and the Hardships suffer'd by the Nation in their Trade, and in their Taxes, which must be the necessary Consequences of continuing the War.*

This Argument, as well as the former, might have been of weight, whilst the Nation was in the dark; but since the Terms are publish'd, we find the difference between *France* and the *Allies* is not some little trifling Circumstance: we are not now disputing for a Town more or less, but for the very End, and

and Real Occasion of the War, for the Kingdom of Spain and the West Indies.

4. His fourth Reason is; *Because, tho Bri-* Pag. 30.
tain were suppos'd to be in a Condition to carry on the War, yet by reason of the breaking out of a new and bloody War in the North, the Consequences of which, be they which way they will, are like to be fatal to the Protestant Religion, and the Confederacy; the Confederates and Allies concern'd in this War, and by whose Assistance we are supply'd with Troops for forming our Armies, are like to be so far embroil'd as to be render'd unable to continue their Forces in our Service, and to yield us that Assistance which otherwise they would do, and without which it would be very difficult for us to carry on the War.

Whatever reason there may have been to apprehend the Consequence of the unhappy Dispute between the Northern Crowns, I am sure that should be no reason for our making so unsafe or dishonourable a Peace as this Author would advise. For besides that their being under a necessity of withdrawing their Troops, is only a Surmise, we should be the less sensible of such a Loss, because the Dutch have offer'd to augment their Forces very considerably, and the new Emperor undertakes, as I am very credibly inform'd, to furnish at least Thirty Thousand Men more for the Service than ever his Brother did: which Promise we may the rather depend on, because the Cause is now his own, and he is likely to take it more to heart than the late Emperor did.

5. His fifth Reason, relating to the dreadful Pag. 31.
Prospect of an approaching Visitation from Heaven, is indeed a very melancholy Subject for all sides concern'd in this War to reflect on: But I am sure, when we consider the just

Judgments of Heaven upon the Ungodly, far from being dismay'd in so righteous a Cause, we should rather with all Christian Humility hope that this Vengeance is not reserv'd for us, but design'd by the great Searcher of all Hearts, as one of his last Trials of that hard-hearted *Pharaoh* the King of *France*, who has treated his own natural Subjects with as much Barbarity, as that cruel *Egyptian* did the People of *Israel* ; who after having been the Cause of so much Rapine and Bloodshed in *Europe*, has at last found that God was resolv'd to baffle his vain and ambitious Attempts at *Universal Monarchy*, by that happy Instrument the Duke of *Marlborough*, whom Heaven seems to have rais'd up for the Service and Support of the Allies, the Humiliation of *France*, and the particular Glory of *England*. How often has that haughty Monarch been admonish'd by Heaven, to think of doing justice to his injur'd Neighbours ? For sure every Victory the Duke of *Marlborough* obtain'd, must have call'd loudly upon his Conscience for Restitution : yet all these Calls have been withstood, till it pleas'd Heaven to visit his Kingdom with a dreadful Famine. The Pulpits then rang with Peace, and the Preachers took liberties with their *Immortal Monarch*, never heard of before during his long and arbitrary Reign. This mov'd him for a while, and caus'd a momentary Repentance : He was then pleas'd to offer Terms of Peace to *Europe* ; but with this double View, of dividing the Allies, and satisfying the Cries of his most wretched oppressed Subjects. For 'tis plain, the whole Negotiation from the beginning was insincere ; he always left himself a Loophole to escape, upon the Explanation
of

of the 37th Article for evacuating *Spain*.——
 The Treaty, it seems, held long enough to
 relieve his present Wants: He had now found
 means to furnish himself with Corn to assuage
 the Hunger of his People ; and the Hardship
 of this Article serv'd him as a Pretext to
 break off a Treaty, which he never design'd
 to conclude. For besides that it cannot be
 imagin'd, that his Grandson would have ven-
 tur'd to disobey his positive Commands, 'tis
 plain by the Steps taken at the time the *French*
Troops were order'd to retire out of *Spain*,
 that his *most Christian Majesty* meant nothing
 less than to desert the Duke of *Anjou* ; his
 Forces were no sooner upon the Frontiers of
Arragon, but they had Orders to disband, and
 all the Soldiers were sent back to take party
 in the *Spanish* Service. This was exactly the
 same Game he had formerly play'd with *Spain*,
 when he supported *Portugal* under-hand, ex-
 pressly contrary to his Oath. And the like
 Sincerity has he shown in every Treaty yet
 concluded with the other Potentates of *Eu-*
rope. It were too long to enumerate the Par-
 ticulars, but it is notoriously known that
Lewis XIV. never yet observ'd any Treaty
 longer than whilst it suited with his own Con-
 venience. Can we then blame the late Mi-
 nistry? Can we blame the *Dutch*? Can we
 blame the rest of the Allies for being willing
 to shave the Locks of this *Sampson*, and bind
 him with such Cords as he might not be able
 to unloose?

If our Sins do call aloud for Vengeance,
 Vengeance will come, neither can the clapping
 up a scandalous Peace secure us against the
 Wrath of Heaven: But let us not increase
 the present Load, by this additional Sin of
 putting

putting the Liberty of our Country in danger. Rather let us imitate the Example of *David*; if we must expiate our Guilt, let us fall into the hands of God, and not into the hands of that Man whose very Mercies are Cruelty.

I believe it will be hardly worth your while, or mine, to be very particular upon the next seven Pages of this Pamphlet, because they are chiefly employ'd in appointing a Congress at *London*, abusing the *Dutch*, and urging the Unreasonableness of supposing that by a future Treaty Spain should be yielded up to the Duke of *Anjou*; and how uncharitable such a Supposition has been, you are now, I believe, able to judg. Let us therefore pass them over, and hasten to his Queries; which I will answer as briefly as I can, in the order they now stand.

Query 1. "Is there no difference between
" *Spain* in the possession of the present *Philip*
" *V.* and his Successors (for he has Heirs)
" and *Spain* in the possession of the King of
" *France*?"

Very little or none; because so long as the *French* King lives, it is certain the Duke of *Anjou* will only be nominal King of *Spain*, and entirely govern'd by such Counsellors as his Grandfather shall think fit to place about him. This is evident from the Authority the *French* now have in *Spain*, and from the little Credit the antient *Grandeess* are in; nay, the Duke of *Anjou* has hardly put himself to the trouble of what the *French* call *Sauver les apparences*? for his Armies, both on the side of *Catalonia* and *Portugal*, have almost always been commanded by Foreigners, his new Treasurer is a *Fleming*, and the *French* Embassa-

dor

dor has in effect ever been his Chief Minister.

Nor will this Union between *France* and *Spain* cease with the War, or even with the Death of the present *French* King; because, the Dependence must still continue. For 'tis impossible the Duke of *Anjou* can propose to himself to get a firmer or more commodious Ally elsewhere, whether we respect the Contiguity of the Dominions of the two Crowns, or that mutual Enmity which ever has been, and is likely to continue after a Partition (if there should be one made) between the Descendants from the Houses of *Bourbon* and *Austria*, even to the tenth Generation:——To say nothing of the Great Debt which the Duke of *Anjou* will owe, at the Conclusion of the Peace, to his Grandfather, and of the Biass naturally incident to Consanguinity, when attended with the stronger Tyes of mutual Interest.

Query 2. "Will not the Heirs of the present King *Philip* be as much *Spaniards* in one Age more, as the Heirs of King *Lewis* will be *French*, & vice versa?"

It may be not: But who shall secure the present Age from all the ill Consequences that may attend the delivering up the Monarchy of *Spain* during the Life of King *Lewis* XIV. to his Grandson?

Query 3. "Will the Interest, either Politick or Trading, of *France* and *Spain* be ever capable of any Union?"

Yes, most certainly: for in regard to Politicks, their mutual Dependence will cause an everlasting Union. And as to their Commerce, it is well known that *France*, either by Force, Permission, or Connivance, has reap'd the

the Advantage of that Trade to *New Spain*, all this War in an open manner, which used formerly, to enrich *England*; and this has encourag'd the King of *France* to set up Wool-len Manufactures of his own, wherewith he has for some years almost intirely supply'd both *Old* and *New Spain*. Nay, that antient Aversion formerly so remarkable between the two Nations, is so perfectly vanish'd (especially from among the *Castilians*, who have the only Right of trading to the *Indies*) that whoever does not dress himself after the *French* manner, is now look'd upon at *Madrid* as a Person disaffected to the Government: For the * *Spada*, † *Capa*, and ‡ *Golillia* are now only worn by the Partisans of the *Austrian* Cause. In short, the *French* have been fighting for the *Castilians* all this War, and the *English* against them. The *French* and *English* have both of them Manufactures of the same kind to dispose of: Judg then, after the Conclusion of the Peace, whether of the two the *Castilian* will chuse to deal with, if he be left to his own Election. You don't, I presume, use to lay out your Mony in your own Borough with the Men that have oppos'd your Election.

Query 4. " Can no Treaty of Commerce
" be so stipulated between the Allies and
" King *Philip*, so as that our Trade may be
" kept free and secure, whether from Em-
" bargoes, Prohibitions, or Impositions, un-
" der the general Guarantees of the whole
" Confederacy?"

* Long-Sword. † Short-Cloke. ‡ Ruff.

Till

Till I see the Terms in which that Guarantie shall be express'd, it will not be reasonable to publish my Exceptions to it: But thus much may be said in general, that when an Alliance is once dissolv'd, Guaranties are not always of very great force, whether we regard the different Views that Process of time may produce in different States, or the doubtful Issue of another War. Neither can such a Guarantie be well expected, unless this present Treaty should be concluded perfectly to the Satisfaction of all the Allies; and I am inform'd some of them are not very well satisfy'd with *Abel Roper's* Comment upon the Preliminaries. I presume it is not to be doubted but *Lewis* the XIVth and the Duke of *Anjou* will make us many fair Promises at this Juncture, in order to get out of their present Difficulties; but we should be a very vain People to expect the King of *France* will observe the Treaties, he shall now make with us, more religiously than he has done those formerly made either with us or other Princes.

Query 5. "Is *Spain* of any Consequence to us, but as our Trade to it is, or is not secured?"

No certainly; but this essential Reason should be of that weight with us, as never to allow of our Consent for leaving of *Spain* and the *Indies* in the possession of the *French*: for I am sure it is not reasonable to expect the Duke of *Anjou* should publish a Prohibition of *French* Wares in our Favour; and yet little less than this will be sufficient to re-establish our Commerce, so many years discontinued with old and new *Spain*. For tho I should allow, that the Goodness and Cheapness of our Manufactures might go a great
D length

length in recovering our pristine Interest; yet these two Qualities, forcible as they are, will never be able to make their way against a fix'd Commerce, under the immediate Protection and Encouragement of the Government. Besides, the *Spanish* Trade is of so nice a nature, that the Affection of the *Castilians* is in some measure requisite to make it prosper. And for that reason the very method now propos'd to secure it, I mean, getting possession of *Cadiz*, might possibly for ever destroy it.

Query 6. " Is *Spain*, in the hands of King " *Philip*, with a considerable Possession freely " given us in *Peru* and *Chili*, a Trade to the " Coast of *America*, and a Tariff of Trade " to *Old Spain*, better for us than *Spain* in " the hand of King *Charles*, entirely resign'd " without any of those Advantages ? "

I must beg leave to inform this Author, that we have actual Treaties already concluded by Mr. *Stanhope* with King *Charles*, at least more practicable, if not more advantageous for our Commerce, than any we can hope to obtain from the Duke of *Anjou* at the ensuing Peace, if we could be so inconsiderate as to think of delivering up *Spain* and the *Indies*, to the detriment of the House of *Austria*. Nor is it possible for the Duke of *Anjou* to give us a place better seated for Commerce to the *Spanish West-Indies* than *Jamaica*, which is already in our possession; from whence we may drive a Trade in the *North-Sea* much more advantageous, and less liable to hazards than that now projected in the *South-Sea*, provided the *Spaniards* be really and *bona fide* inclin'd to trade with us; and if they are not, I am sure all the new Colonies we could plant in

in *Chili* or *Peru*, would but serve to depopulate *England* to no purpose.

But I cannot help observing, that both this Author, and the rest of his Friends, who have writ so copiously of late concerning the vast Advantages that may result from a *South-Sea* Trade, seem either very little inform'd of the nature of the *Spanish* Trade, or else very disingenuously bent to keep their Readers in the dark upon that Subject. But our *Spanish* Merchants know, that the *West-Indies* were first discover'd at the Expence of *Isabella* of *Castile*, and for that reason her Subjects only have the liberty of trading thither. This is a Benefit, from which the *Aragonese* are entirely excluded, by the Constitution of the *Chamber of Seville*, a particular Corporation, to whose Inspection, under the Great Council of the *Indies*, the Management of this Trade is entirely committed. And whatever Commerce has at any time been carry'd on in that Country, either by the *English*, or by the Subjects of any other State, has always been by connivance in the name of some *Castilian*. The *Chamber of Seville* therefore would think themselves as highly injur'd by any Treaty that should give away their Privileges to Strangers, as our *East-India* Company would do if King *James*, or any other arbitrary Prince, should have admitted the *French* into a share of their Commerce to *China*: Much more will they exclaim against the delivering up of any part of their Plantations abroad to Foreigners. And how promising soever such new Possessions may be of a fruitful Commerce at the first View, in my humble Opinion, it is greatly to be apprehended, that far from contributing towards the main End propos'd

by them, they may prove a Bone of Contention between *England* and *Spain*, and destroy that very Trade they would promote.

Nor ought we to flatter our selves with the hopes of succeeding, as the *French* have done, during the Disorders of the present War; *Inter Arma silent Leges*: and it is very possible that for some years past the *French*, either under pretence of Convoys, or of furnishing the Mines with *Negros*, may have carry'd on a Trade to *New Spain*, without observing the usual Formalities; neither is it to be doubted, that whilst the Duke of *Anjou* shall continue in possession of *Spain*, the *French*, in contempt of the antient Constitution and Property of the *Spaniards*, will endeavour to carry on the same Trade, and in the same manner, to the prejudice of the rest of *Europe*: and this seems pretty evident by their Design of keeping possession of *Lima*, in case the last Treaty of Peace had gone forward. But should *Spain* ever be so happy to shake off the *French* Yoke, should the *Grandeess* be ever restor'd to their former Credit, and the antient Constitution of that Monarchy revive, the Case would be extremely alter'd, and the *Spaniards* would, in all probability, again become as jealous of their *West-India* Commerce, as they have been formerly. And in that Case a *South-Sea* Trade, according to the usual Idea now conceiv'd of that Design, would prove a very difficult, if not an impracticable Project.

Query 7. " Whether as to Power and the
 " Ballance of *Europe*, may it not be as fatal
 " to have *Spain* and the *Indies*, i. e. the whole
 " undivided Monarchy of *Spain*, come to the
 " House of *Austria*, and be annex'd to the
 " Empire,

“ *Empire*, as to have part of it only in a
 “ Branch of the House of *Bourbon*, and that
 “ Branch not at all annex’d to the Kingdom
 “ of *France* ?”

This *Query* is stated in such a manner, as to
 beg a very material part of the Question; for
 I do deny that it is possible for any part of
 the *Spanish* Monarchy to remain with the Duke
 of *Anjou* in such a manner, as not to be at
 all annex’d to the Kingdom of *France*; and,
 I hope, I have in some measure prov’d this
 in my Answers to the former *Queries*.

But as to what regards the Danger that *Eu-
 rope* may run, by suffering the *Empire* and *Spain*
 to be united; I answer, That whoever will
 give himself the trouble of looking back into
 the Histories of the Emperors *Maximilian*
 and *Charles V.* when the *Empire* and *Spain*
 were at the height of their Glory, and had
 much larger Dominions than now, will find
 that their united Force was not sufficient to
 reduce *France*, till *England* interpos’d, and
 turn’d the Scale. I mean this more particu-
 larly in regard to *Francis I.* who was taken
 Prisoner at the Siege of *Pavia* by the Duke of
Bourbon, then General in Pay for *Henry VIII.*
 And every one knows the Dominions of *France*
 have been as greatly enlarg’d since those days,
 as the Territories of the House of *Austria*
 have been diminish’d.

I shall not deny, that the House of *Austria*
 has formerly had as great a Passion for Uni-
 versal Monarchy as the *French*; and it is but
 a very melancholy Reflection to observe, how
 often *England* has been deluded by them both,
 whilst they were Rivals for Universal Sway:
 but the Modesty and good Temper of the
 House of *Austria* has been very remarkable
 ever

ever since those Disappointments *Charles V.* met with, which gave him a Surfeit of Vain-Glory, and oblig'd him to renounce both that and the World together. Nor was any thing further wanting for the perfect Humiliation of that *House*, but the Destruction of their *Invincible Armada* in Eighty Eight, which was follow'd by the Loss of the *Low Countries*.

The Kingdom of *Spain*, since that time, has been so negligent of her *Naval Affairs*, she has scarce Ships sufficient to bring home her Gold and Silver from *Peru* and *Mexico*. And her vast Dominions in the *West-Indies* have been so ill guarded, she has frequently been insulted there by small Parties of the *Buccaneers*. But the Scale of *France* has for many years been rising, as fast as that of the House of *Austria* has been falling. What vast Acquisitions has she made since the *Pyrenean Treaty*? What a Stand has she made, during the present War, against the united Force of *Europe*, even whilst *Spain* was a Burden to her? What prodigious Fleets has she equip'd, how often has she vy'd with the Maritime Powers in their own Element? And tho' the Convenience of supporting *Spain* by Land, has freed her from the Expence of putting such large Fleets to Sea as *England* and *Holland* have been oblig'd to fit out, as well for the Transport of Forces, as for the Protection of their Commerce: Yet when this Alliance shall be once dissolv'd, what will not *England* have to apprehend from the Ambition of *France*, supported by the Wealth and Alliance of *Spain*?

Query 8. " Whether the Death of the late
" *Emperor* has not alter'd the Case, and
" chang'd the face of *Europe*, so that a Parti-
" tion of the *Spanish* Monarchy, which was

" not

“ not reasonable, the Estates of the House of
 “ *Austria* being in two Branches, is now be-
 “ come necessary, when they are all united in
 “ one? ”

What has been already said, in my Remarks on the former *Query*, may in some measure serve for an Answer to this. Besides, a Treaty of Partition is not so easy a matter to adjust as this Author may imagine, as great a Master as he would appear to be in Politics. 'Tis very well known what ill Success the last met with at Home, what Liberties of Speech were taken in the House of Commons upon that Subject, and how ill the same was executed Abroad; for his Most Christian Majesty made no other use of that Treaty, but to cheat the Allies, and get possession of the entire *Spanish* Monarchy for his Grandson.

But if there should be a necessity for a Partition; that is, if the House of *Austria* should, for the Peace of *Europe*, be contented to recede from her just Demands, and yield up a part of her Inheritance to the Duke of *Anjou*, why must it be the most essential part of that Monarchy, for which we have so long been fighting? Why must we deliver up *Spain* and the *Indies* to a Prince, that must ever be dependant upon *France*, and not rather chuse to preserve those valuable Parts of the *Spanish* Monarchy for the House of *Austria*, who must depend upon us for Support, which will be the great, and indeed the only Security of our *Spanish* and *Turkey* Trade? And these concern us so nearly, that the Loss of them would, in a very few years, affect the Landed Men more than the present Taxes do, tho they are so much complain'd of. This has been prov'd to a degree of Demonstration,
 in

in a late Pamphlet, entitled, *A Letter to a Member of the October-Club, shewing, that to yield Spain to the Duke of ANJOU by a Peace, would be the Ruin of Great Britain.* And I beg leave to recommend that Treatise to your serious Perusal; for if you read only the Papers that are publish'd on your own side, you will never be able to form a right Judgment of the true Interest of your Country.

Query 9. "Whether, had the Grand Alliance been now to be made, it would not have been probable, that the Confederates would have stipulated, that the Crown of Spain should no more be in the Person of the Emperor than of the King of France?"

If the Grand Alliance were now to be form'd, I greatly apprehend it would not be made at all; and therefore I am sure it imports us highly to take care it be not dissolv'd before the great and essential Ends propos'd by it shall be obtain'd. Nor will it be necessary to give you all the Reasons I have to believe this; because one may be sufficient, and that is, that there is always a great Difference between the Dispositions which Allies have at the beginning, and those which their separate Interests may have suggested to them before the end of a tedious War. But were this the beginning of the War, and the Grand Alliance now to be form'd, I verily believe, that all the Allies would much rather have agreed to procure the Restitution of the entire Spanish Monarchy to Charles III. (tho he is elected Emperor) than have consented that any part of that Monarchy, or at least so very essential a Share as Spain and the Indies, should remain in possession of the House of Bourbon.

been prov'd to a degree of Demonstration

For

For tho in the first Grand Alliance between the Emperor, England and Holland, it is only said, That a reasonable Satisfaction shall be procur'd for the House of Austria: Yet when the Alliance was made between the Emperor, England, Portugal and Holland, the Allies being then better appriz'd of the dangerous Consequences that might attend the yielding up any part of the Spanish Dominions to the French, it was exprelly stipulated in the 21st Article of the League Offensive, that that Monarchy should be preserv'd entire to the House of Austria.

Neque Pax, neque Inducia fieri poterint nisi mutuo consensu omnium Faderatorum, neq; ullo tempore fient manente in Hispania secundo Genito Regis Christianissimi ex Delphino Nepote, quolibetve alio Principe ex stirpe Gallica: That is, Neither Peace nor Truce shall be made, but by the mutual Consent of all the Allies: Neither shall there be at any time a Peace concluded, whilst his Most Christian Majesty's second Grandson by the Dauphin, or any other Prince of French Extraction shall continue in Spain.

Query 10. "Whether so many Expedients offering themselves in this Case, it may be worth all the Blood that may yet be expended, before France can be compel'd to yield up the whole Spanish Monarchy, and King Philip be driven entirely out of it; and whether a reasonable Partition be not better than such a Conquest?"

I cannot tell what Expedients this Author means; but 'tis plain, by the Post-Boy's Explanation on the new Prelimintries, the Expedient there intended, is delivering up of Spain and the West-Indies to the Duke of Anjou: and how happy this would prove for

E

England,

England, I hope I have already shown. But what reason there is that we should think of worse Expedients now than two years ago, I cannot imagine; because 'tis plain we have obtain'd several Advantages over the *French* since the last Offers of Peace. But if the whole Alliance should agree to make another Partition-Treaty, it were to be wish'd the Duke of *Savoy* might rather have those Branches that shall be lopt off from the *Spanish* Monarchy than the Duke of *Anjou*, who must be Dependant at least, if not Tributary to *France*, wherever his Fortune shall dispose of him.

Not that I have less Compassion for my Country than this pacifick Author, or would desire to see the War continu'd one moment longer, than till her Majesty and her Allies should be convinc'd that a Peace might be safely and honourably concluded. But the reason why I have taken the Liberty to start this Proposal is, because I fear whatever Part shall be allotted to the Duke of *Anjou*, that very Part, after the Alliance is once dissolv'd, may very probably enable his Grandfather and him to recover the rest of the *Spanish* Monarchy; at least it is certain this Use was made of the last Partition-Treaty: and if we are now so very weary of the War, I do not know whether we should be inclinable to begin a new one, even upon so urgent an Occasion again. Nay, if we should, it would be great presumption to hope, that we could ever bring it to so fair an Issue as the present War is likely to have, if thro our own Impatience we do not destroy the Fruit of all our Labours.

Query 11. " Whether we are sure that we
" shall ever be able to compleat the Conquest
" of

“ of it, and force them to the Evacuation
 “ we pretend to; and if not, whether the
 “ Partition may not at last be made upon
 “ worse Terms than it may now ? ”

Nothing upon Earth is certain that is not already past; but we have very great reason to believe we may so far distress the King of *France*, as to reduce him to a necessity of evacuating *Spain* (which is certainly in his power to do) for every Year has contributed something towards this Great and Glorious End. Yet I confess it is not impossible but the Partition may, at last, be made upon worse Terms than are at present offer'd; for according to the new way of thinking, which a particular Set of Men are lately fallen into, two Victories more obtain'd by the Duke of *Marlborough*, would be an undeniable Reason for leaving the *Spanish* Monarchy entire with the Duke of *Anjou*.

Thus having endeavour'd to answer both this Author's *Reasons* for a Peace, and his *Queries* concerning the Conditions upon which that Peace should in his Opinion be concluded, I shall not trouble you with any Observations upon his two Partitions, because I believe they will neither of them be confirm'd at the ensuing Congress: nor do they contain any thing material that has not been already touch'd upon in his *Queries*; by which, I suppose, he imagin'd, he had sufficiently prepar'd you to swallow them.

But it may be worth your while seriously to reflect, as well upon the great and essential Difference there is between the last Preliminaries and the present, as upon the different manner of their Introduction into the World, and of the ill Consequences that may possibly

ensue upon the meeting of a Congress to treat of Preliminaries, that stand so much in need of an Explanation.

For tho no Man can imagine, that the Queen is capable of entertaining the least Thought, that does not tend directly to the Advantage of the Alliance in general, as well as of these Kingdoms in particular : yet I believe it will be no bold Assertion to say, that when the present Preliminaries shall come to be discuss'd in a General Congress, *France* may possibly find the means to create Jealousies amongst the Allies ; nay, his *Most Christian Majesty* seems already to have laid a sure Foundation for this between the *Dutch* and us, in that Article relating to the Surrender of *Dunkirk*. If this should happen, tho her Majesty has hitherto held the Ballance of *Europe* with such Success, she will no longer be the sole Arbiter in this important Affair. And the Consequence of this may be, that we shall exchange the *Great Guarantie of our Protestant Succession*, for a Recognition of the Queen's Title by the King of *France* ; which he will regard as much as he did his Recognition of *King William of ever Glorious Memory*, by the Treaty of *Ryswick*. For whatever he may promise in these times of urgent necessity, 'tis certain he has nothing more at heart than restoring the *Pretender* to *England*, after he shall have secur'd *Spain* to his own Family. And this is what he publicly promis'd to the Duke of *Berwick*, when he first sent him to command his Forces in *Spain*.

As unjustly then as your Pamphleteer has been pleas'd to reflect upon the Allies, more particularly the *Dutch*, for the Manner in which the last Articles were treated of ; it is evident that no other Method could have been

been devis'd, to secure them against the usual Frauds and Artifice of *France*. It was for this reason that they wisely resolv'd to have all the material Points fully and plainly adjusted by way of Preliminaries, before they would allow of a Congress, or agree to a Suspension of Arms; and yet notwithstanding all this Caution, the *French* Plenipotentiaries found a way to escape upon the Explanation of the 37th Article. But what greater Security have we now of his *most Christian Majesty's* Sincerity than we had before, that we should venture to treat with him upon Preliminaries so very ambiguous, and so much less satisfactory than the former?

Far be it from me to suspect that any of our Allies are capable of deserting us. All the malicious Reports that have been spread abroad concerning them, nay, all this Author has said to provoke them, will never, I hope, be able to shake their steady Faith, and produce so fatal an effect; but every one knows what strange Liberties have been taken in publick Discourse with some of our Allies, particularly the Duke of *Savoy*, and the King of *Portugal*. What a noise did a Letter make in the world, that was intercepted in that Prince's own Country by a *British* General? We were told in every Coffee-house, that the *Portuguese* were an useless and unfaithful Ally; that they were certainly clapping up a separate Peace with *France*; and that the Ballance of our Commerce was not an Equivalent for the Expence of our Troops, and the Subsidy paid to that Country. Yet I do not hear that the *Portuguese* have ventur'd to recriminate; and for my part, I confess I have charity enough to hope there was no worse Intention

tention in Mr. P — —'s Journey to *Paris*, than there was in Monsieur *Hailliot's* to *Madrid*. Yet things of this nature do sometimes create Jealousys, and are made an ill use of, by a disaffected Party amongst us, who would be glad to divide the Alliance.

Peace indeed is a very desirable thing, and we have many reasons to wish for an End of this Expensive War: for it must be confess'd our Taxes are heavy, in regard to what *England* has formerly been accusom'd to; but if we compare them with what our Allies bear, they will not seem so grievous, much less would they appear a Burden in comparison with the Taxes of *France*, which by the last Imposition of *Dismes* or Tenth's are arriv'd to a degree of Oppression not to be conceiv'd by an *Englishman*. The justest View that can at this distance be taken of them, is from the Proclamation, which his *most Christian Majesty* was pleas'd to publish upon the first collecting of that Tax.

“ **L**EWIS by the Grace of God King of
 “ *France* and *Navarre*: To all who shall
 “ see these Presents, Greeting. The Conti-
 “ nuation of the War having oblig'd us to
 “ demand of our Subjects the Tenth of their
 “ Estates, and our Intention being to cause
 “ that Tax to be receiv'd without any Ex-
 “ pence to us by Persons nominated by us
 “ for that purpose, and who are immediate-
 “ ly to pay the same into our Royal Trea-
 “ sury; We have thought that (for making
 “ the speedier Advantage thereof with re-
 “ spect to the Payment of our Troops, for
 “ which Use truly and solely that Tax is le-
 “ vied) it would be best expressly to assign the
 “ same

“ same to those who shall lend and advance
 “ Mony for so just and necessary an Use, by
 “ declaring the said Tenth free and quit of
 “ all other Application or Appropriation, as
 “ well for the time past as to come. For
 “ these Causes and others moving us there-
 “ unto, of our certain Knowledg, full Power,
 “ and Royal Authority, We have by these
 “ Presents sign’d with our Hand, pronounc’d,
 “ declar’d, and ordain’d, and our Will and
 “ Pleasure is, that M. *Boucot*, Receiver of our
 “ good City of *Paris* and of the Tenth, shall
 “ keep a Register in which every Person may
 “ subscribe the Sum he is willing to lend and
 “ advance within the present Month of *De-*
 “ *cember*, to the Sum of three Millions only,
 “ which shall be employ’d to pay our Troops,
 “ Recruits, and for Horses; which Sums
 “ subscrib’d shall be repaid to the Lenders in
 “ the Month of *April* next, with Interest at
 “ the rate of Ten *per Cent.* which they shall
 “ stop out of the Sums they advance. We
 “ will, that the said Interest be paid to them
 “ the Day they shall bring in their Mony;
 “ for the Repayment of which we assign the
 “ first Sums that shall arise by the Reception
 “ of the Tenth, which we declare free from
 “ all other Appropriations or Obligations, as
 “ well past as to come. We will, that in
 “ favour of those who shall lend and advance
 “ the Sum of one hundred thousand Livres,
 “ Letters of Nobility shall be made out to
 “ them, without their being oblig’d to disco-
 “ ver their Descent, which we do expressly
 “ dispense with by these Presents: Ordain-
 “ ing, that those who shall obtain the said
 “ Letters, shall be deem’d and reputed No-
 “ ble by Extraction, and and as such shall
 “ enjoy

“ enjoy all the Præeminences, Distinctions and
 “ Prerogatives granted to the antient Nobles
 “ of our Kingdom, derogating for that pur-
 “ pose from all Customs, Ordinances, and
 “ Arrests. For such is our Pleasure, &c.
 “ Given at *Versailles* the 2d of *December* in the
 “ Year of Grace 1710, &c.

Sign'd, *LOUIS.*

To this might be added, that the Duke of
Anjou has not long ago demanded all the
 Church-Plate in *Spain*, to secure it from fal-
 ling into the hands of *Hereticks*. Which two
 Circumstances, in my humble Opinion, are un-
 deniable Proofs of the very low Condition
 both *France* and *Spain* are reduc'd to. Nor is
 it possible we should be deter'd from carrying
 on the War by any Apprehension of our En-
 emies being more rich, or powerful than we
 are. What then remains that can so strong-
 ly incline you to wish for an immediate Peace?
 Is it the vast Advantage you hope your Coun-
 try may reap from the Mines of *Mexico* and
Peru? If that Vision be still of any weight
 with you, after what has been already said;
 read the following Story, and make your own
 Application.

Vid. Histo-
ria de
Portugal
Restaura-
do. By the
Conde da
Ericeyra.

Dom Sebastian King of Portugal being slain
 in that famous Battel fought between him and
 the *Moors* in *Africa*, his Uncle *Henry* the Car-
 dinal succeeded to the Crown, who being past
 all hopes of having Children (tho the Pope
 had given him leave to marry) and taking
 no care to settle the Succession before his
 Death, left his Country expos'd to a nu-
 merous Train of Pretenders. Amongst these,
Philip II. of Spain prov'd the strongest, and
 got

got possession of the Kingdom; which after his Decease descended to his Son *Philip III.* who concluded that memorable Truce with the *Dutch* for twelve Years, whereby they were at last establish'd a *Free Republick*, after a War of near eighty Years wag'd in the Cause of Liberty. But his Successor *Philip IV.* being a Prince of more Spirit than his Father, resolv'd to break with the *United Provinces*, and had given them much Uneasiness, but the League at *Avignon* for the Peace of *Italy* found him other Employment.

The *Dutch* being now in less pain for their Territories in *Europe*, began to think of enlarging their Dominions abroad, and resolv'd to invade the *Brazils*, to which they thought they had as good a Title as King *Philip* had to *Portugal*; and they hop'd to render themselves as considerable a People by the Wealth of that Country, as the *Spaniards* were by the Treasures of *Peru* and *Mexico*. Neither did they doubt but the irreconcilable Hatred which the *Portuguese* bore to the *Spanish* Government would help to make their Attempt the more easy. For the better prosecution of this great Design, a *Brazil Company* was form'd, *Vide Istoria delle Guerre del Regno de Brasile, par Gio. Gioseppe di S. Teresa Carmelitano Scalzo.* with a prodigious Stock, and with such ample Privileges as engag'd the whole Commonwealth in the Project. A considerable Fleet was immediately equip'd, and the Prince of *Orange* went in Person upon this Expedition; which was push'd with great Vigour, but various Success, till the Rebellion in *Catalonia*, and the Revolution in *Portugal* so effectually employ'd King *Philip* at home, that he had no leisure to send Succours to *Brazil*, by which means that Country fell almost intire into the hands of the *Dutch*.

In 1641, which was the Year after *John Duke of Braganza* had taken upon him the Title of King of *Portugal*, and shaken off the Dominion of *Spain*, being still in War with that Country, supported underhand by *France*, and openly by *England*: he sent *Tristan de Mendonza* his Embassador to the *Hague*, to conclude a Truce with the *Dutch* for ten Years, and make a modest Demand for Restitution of the *Brazils*; which the States General had no manner of inclination to part with, tho *Mendonza* urg'd his Master's Hereditary, Indefeasible, and Unalienable Right to those Countries, as far as was convenient at that juncture. But as the *Portuguese* were not in condition to exert themselves, the Truce was agreed to upon such Conditions as they were able to get, and the Title of the *Dutch* to the *Brazils*, by this Treaty, in some measure confirm'd.

Nay, the new King of *Portugal* was so sensible how much it imported him to keep well with the *States General*, 'tis believ'd he design'd either to have bought the Province of *Pernamboke* from them again, or else to have complimented them with an intire Release of his Right to it. But it happen'd in the Year 1644, that one *Juan Fernandez Vieira*, a *Mulatto* born in the *Maderas*, took a fancy to raise some Commotions against the *Dutch* at *Reciffe*, a Town in the Province of *Pernamboke*; and having gather'd a Body of the discontented People, whose numbers increas'd every day, writ to the King of *Portugal* for Succours, which were publicly refus'd him.

The *Dutch* complain'd of this Insurrection at the Court of *Lisbon*; and the King, to give them satisfaction, proclaim'd *Vieira* a Traitor,

Vid. the
same Au-
thors, and
likewise
the Life of
Vieira.

Traitor, hang'd him *in effigie*, and promis'd that his Governour of the *Bahia* should join the *Dutch* Forces and suppress the Rebels: for it was not yet convenient to avow the Satisfaction he had in *Vieira's* good Services. But Orders were dispatch'd underhand to the Governour of *Bahia* to join him, and these Orders so effectually obey'd, that in a very few years *Juan Fernandez Vieira*, as inconsiderable a Fellow as he appear'd at first to be, did actually beat the *Dutch* out of the *Brazils*; and I do not find they have been permitted to trade thither ever since.

But I hope I shall very shortly have the Honour of seeing you at the *Smyrna*, and then I will communicate some things to you not so proper to be printed. Mean time, pray do me the justice to believe that I am,

S I R,

London, November 1.
1711.

Your most Obedient
Humble Servant.

Visitor, hang'd him in office, and promis'd
 that his Government of the Babi should join
 the Dutch Forces and suppress the Rebels:
 for it was not yet convenient to avow the sa-
 tisfaction he had in Wina's good Services.
 But Orders were dispatch'd understand to the
 Government of Babi to join him, and these
 Orders to effectually obey'd, that in a very
 few years from thence Wina, as inconsider-
 table a Fellow as he appear'd at first to be,
 did actually beat the Dutch out of the Babi's;
 and I do not find they have been permitted
 to trade thither ever since.

But I hope I shall very shortly have the Ho-
 nour of seeing you at the Swan, and then
 I will communicate some things to you not so
 proper to be printed. Mean time, pray do
 me the Justice to believe that I am,

SIR,

Your most Obedient
 Humble Servant.

London, No-
 vember 14
 1711.

